Though a vast literature considers whether the enactment of laws and regulations impacts markets, very little attention has been paid to the ability of courts to have such an effect. This article fills this gap by providing evidence that court decisions can bring to bear existing legal standards and can have significant effects on market behavior, especially if they convey credible commitments to enforce sanctions. This study shows that the outcome of certain court decisions can reduce illicit trade. By analyzing novel disaggregated data of antiquities sold at auction in the past 20 years, our results indicate that as a result of punitive court rulings the share of legitimate items (measured by their ownership history, or provenance) and the price premium paid for such items both increased. In addition, we show that standard assumptions behind repeat sales indices fail to hold as buyers' tastes change.
Law and economics scholarship has long been concerned with the ability of laws to impact markets. Economists have studied how laws criminalizing certain behavior affect the supply and demand for trade, examples range from human trafficking (Akee et al. , 2014) to prostitution (Gertler & Shah, 2011) to drugs (Becker et al. , 2006) . However, due to the nature of the markets in question, it is difficult to collect individual-level price data on market transactions, and to verify models of market behavior under legal regulation. This is further complicated when markets are global and different laws apply, along with the fact that legal scholarship generally focuses on the existence of such laws, rather than on their effectiveness (Posner & Goldsmith, 2005; Simmons, 2010) . Both economists and legal scholars agree that in order to be effective, laws must be supported by credible enforcement mechanisms, and litigation through the courts is one way to raise such credibility (Becker, 1968; North & Weingast, 1989; Levmore & Porat, 2014 ). Yet, questions about the ability of courts to impact markets have received little attention in empirical scholarship:
existing studies suggest that courts can act to mobilize change, but they have not been able to conclusively prove so (Donohue & Heckman, 1991; Rosenberg, 2008; Simmons, 2010) . This paper contributes to the above literature by showing how court rulings can induce changes in market composition and prices, using evidence from the global antiquities trade. This study tries to overcome some of the limitations outlined above by predicting that court decisions will be effective at correcting criminal behavior in if they can make credible commitments to enforce sanctions -in a way that the mere existence of laws is unable to do. The study also addresses data shortcomings by developing a sufficiently detailed dataset that allows us to empirically test changes to the supply and demand for antiquities when court rulings alter the costs of trading illegal items.
By analyzing disaggregated data on worldwide antiquities sales in the past 20 years, this paper provides new evidence on the link between levels of enforcement and changes in market behavior.
Our hypothesis is that market participants will respond to court rulings, if the latter sent out credible signals that sanctions will be enforced when laws are not complied with. We identify two landmark cases that send such signals in the antiquities market. Both cases involve the criminal prosecutions of dealers for trafficking stolen objects, and they share two main features: they resulted in highly punitive outcomes, and they clarified the applicability of existing laws. Importantly they also established that antiquities must meet specific threshold dates in order to be legitimately traded: Egyptian objects require a verifiable pre-1983 ownership history [U. S. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d N.5359 (2005) ]. These threshold dates allow us to verify whether each object in our data has been auctioned legally, and to look at changes in auctions' composition and prices before and after the court verdicts. As threats to sanction intensify as a consequence of such rulings, we expect to find that buyers will pay a premium for antiquities meeting the above thresholds, and that sellers will cater to them by selecting matching objects.
We have assembled data that allows us to test whether the proportion of verifiably legal antiquities has increased and if the premium for such objects has risen as a result of the Schultz and Medici court rulings. The data consist of information on all Egyptian, Classical, and Western Asiatic antiquities sold at Christie's and Sotheby's between 1996 and 2014, comprising a total of 23,335
items. Besides categorical information on the object's physical characteristics and details of the sale, the data record the ownership history of each object, also known as provenance, starting with the earliest date at which ownership can be corroborated. The disaggregated nature of the data allows us to use such information to proxy for the probability that an object is sold in compliance with applicable laws and to compare changing attitudes towards provenance in the supply-side and the demand-side of the market over time.
Based on our hypothesis of changes in market behavior, we empirically test the expected supplyand demand-side responses implied by increased compliance. On the supply side, we expect auction objects' average provenance quality to rise, with more verifiably legal objects being available. On the demand side, we expect the premium paid for provenance to increase, especially at the top end of the market, as those objects are more likely to come under legal scrutiny, and good provenance is critical to their liquidity. Our basic empirical approach implements difference-in-difference regressions to estimate changes in the supply of and demand for provenance after the court verdicts. We supplement the analysis with time-trend regressions that find significant structural changes in the aftermath of the rulings: the percentage of legal objects on the market as well as the premium paid for such object rise sharply and significantly. Western Asiatic objects were not legally impacted by court decisions and therefore serve as a placebo; they do not show the same consistent changes in market supply and demand as do other types of objects.
Overall our results show that participants in the antiquities market did respond to the sanctioning signals introduced by court decisions. This is not intuitive, as the trade of looted antiquities had been outlawed long before these cases were decided. Our conclusion is that the passing of anti-smuggling laws was not effective per se but only gained traction once upheld by the courts.
This insight aligns with previous quantitative studies of the antiquities market, which are helpful in identifying market patterns going further back in time: they confirm that notwithstanding the passing of laws criminalizing illicit trade, the antiquities market did not consistently reward provenance (Lobay, 2009; Brodie, 2014b Brodie, , 2016 . Beyond the antiquities market itself, the results show that court decisions can clarify legal standards and convey credible commitments to sanction non-compliance with those standards, thereby inducing significant changes in market behavior.
In addition our analysis explicitly accounts for the fact that legality is distinct from but covaries with other quality enhancers. We consider that buyers may value an object's prestigious history, even if such history does not imply legality. Provenance as quality enhancer in the art market was previously studied in connection with Old Masters by Ginsburgh & Schwed (1992) , but without referencing legality, which is critical as most Old Masters require export licenses to counter illicit trade or World War II theft claims. By taking into account trade-offs between quality and legality this study contributes to the literature on certification mechanisms that stimulate markets, which up to now has ignored legality issues (Wimmer & Chezum, 2003; Ramanarayanan & Snyder, 2012; Elfenbein et al. , 2016) . The latter specifically matter in the international trade context, where different standards apply according to where goods are sold.
For the art auction literature, the changing value of provenance applies most critically to measurements of the investment value of art (the seminal papers are by Baumol, 1986; Mei & Moses, 2002) , which use repeat sales indices as the standard for characterizing art as an asset class. If the market value of provenance changes over time, the identifying assumption behind repeat sales indices fails to hold. We show that before 2005, annual returns on repeat sales did not differ by provenance; after 2005, items with legal provenance earned higher returns. In other words, an item without legal provenance that returns to auction after many years is no longer considered to be the "same" item, since its poor provenance now devalues it.
Finally, we address concerns about the selection issues that ensue from the results' limited focus on objects sold at auction, and discuss whether increased legal scrutiny shifted the sale of unprovenanced pieces to other market channels. By focusing on sales by Sotheby's and Christie's our results cover an important portion of the public international market for antiquities, but they do not address other dimensions of the trade, such as sales through dealers, galleries or online platforms. We explore how alternative selling venues compare before and after the court rulings through a hypothetical, which confirms that our findings are plausible when other dimensions of the market are taken into account. The hypothetical does not however take into account black market sales, as we have insufficient information on how such transactions work. Yet we can observe other events, such as increased enforcement in response to the recent looting in the Middle East (Europol, 2015) , or institutional policy changes requiring antiquities to meet strict provenance requirements before being exhibited or donated (Association of Art Museum Directors, 2011). Without dismissing the existence of the black market, such facts seem to endorse our finding that the market for looted antiquities is shrinking.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the legal background and identifies key event dates; Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and results; Section 4 discusses the implications of the results and section 5 concludes.
Legal Background and Hypothesis
This Section discusses the legal environment in which the antiquities market operates and addresses specific legal issues associated with illicit trade.
While art has developed into a fully fledged commodities market trading on the interplay of supply and demand, it lacks the transparency of regulations that rule most such markets. The possibility that an artwork has been stolen or that it is the product of illicit trade raises a number of complex legal issues, from public law questions (state immunity, export laws and the law of war) to private law aspects (ownership rights) as well as procedural elements (statues of limitations); see Vadi & Schneider (2014) for more background. Several legal instruments have attempted to regulate such issues, and key among them is the 1970 UNESCO Convention, an international treaty specifically created to manage theft and the illicit traffic of ancient objects (O'Keefe, 2000; Merryman et al. , 2007) . The Convention had the effect of committing its 131 signatories to enact national laws to seize illegally exported objects found on their territory and repatriate them to their country of origin. 1 Despite the fact that such measures have been applicable for a long time, they have not effectively deterred the theft and sale of looted objects (Lobay, 2009; Brodie, 2014b ).
This may be true for a variety of reasons, ranging from general under-enforcement, to choice of law questions, to difficulties with enforcing sanctions when such laws are breached.
The major issues arising with disputes of this kind revolve around the ownership and the origin of ancient objects. As a general rule most laws provide that antiquities are owned by the governments ruling on the territory where they are found, and when they are traded across borders without official authorization they amount to stolen property and can become subject to a restitution claim (for more details on such claims see Prott & O'Keefe (1988) and the IFAR (2016) database). In the context of an illegal export claim, courts face two issues: first, they have to verify the origin of an object to establish which jurisdiction applies, and second, they have to determine whether such jurisdiction asserted state ownership to the object before it left its country of origin. Verifying the origin of an object is not a straightforward task, unless the object was documented in existing records or there are clear indications that it belongs to a specific site. 2 Assuming proof of origin can be established, the next step involves determining which laws were applicable at the time the object left its country of origin. The years in which ownership laws are passed create threshold dates for the trade in ancient objects: for repatriation claims to be successful the relevant ownership laws need to predate the export of the object. Thus, an object's provenance can be used to verify if the object may be traded under the relevant laws.
By making these key determinations the role of courts becomes crucial at resolving ownership disputes and more generally at bringing legal standards to bear. Our analysis suggests that court interventions may be needed to produce the deterring effect that should have already been present by virtue of existing laws. We argue that in order to have such an effect court ruling must meet certain conditions. First, the court outcomes must be grounded in existing legislation and there must be public support condemning the behavior at issue; second, the outcomes themselves must clearly specify the rules for acceptable behavior; and third, they must convey credible commitments to enforce sanctions if such rules are not complied with. If the above conditions are present, we expect to see court rulings exert pressure on market participants to comply with existing regulation Table 1 provides context by presenting a timeline of illicit trade cases that were decided before and after Schultz and Medici, including outcomes, applicable laws and citation counts, which further signal their importance. In the next Section we introduce our data, and in Section 3 we test for structural changes in market trends. Our results point to significant changes in 2003 and 2005, coinciding with the years the Schultz and Medici cases were decided. This is evidence that previous legal events did not achieve the same impact: that existing legislation and other court cases did not affect the market as much as the cases discussed above.
Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics

Antiquities Auctions and Provenance Coding
We test the above hypothesis with data on antiquities sold at auction. The auctions in our dataset are all open-outcry auctions in which items are sold sequentially in lots and the auctioneer increases the price until only one bidder remains, at which point the lot is sold. Each lot has an undisclosed reserve price as well as a low and a high estimate. If the highest bidder does not meet the reserve price the lot goes unsold. For a complete description of art auctions' idiosyncrasies see Ashenfelter (1989) and Ashenfelter & Graddy (2006 , 2010 .
The data consists of 23,335 lots offered for sale at Christie's or Sotheby's antiquities auctions from 1996 to 2014. 3 Each house has locations in London and New York; we ignore items from Sotheby's London, because they ceased selling antiquities shortly after our sample begins. Reflecting standard auction practice the objects are grouped into three categories: Classical (Greek/Roman), Egyptian, and Western Asiatic, and from the auction catalogues we collect details about the auction itself; information on the object's characteristics, such as the material and shape; provenance information; the average appraisal price; and the sale price, if the object sold. When the provenance indicates a previous sale of the same object, we additionally record the conditions of that sale by tracing further back in auction catalogues. All prices are converted into 2015 U.S. dollars.
Next we standardize provenance information in order to perform an objective quantitative analysis. Catalogued provenance can include information on an object's previous ownership, public exhibition, publication in journals or books, and previous sales. It can also include details about the site and date of an object's excavation, or note the presence of export certificates. Besides of being an indicator of an object's legitimacy, provenance information can directly raise an object's desirability: museum exhibitions as well as previous ownership by renowned collectors give an object a more prestigious back-story. Since provenance can affect prices through multiple channels, it is important to characterize both its qualitative aspects as well as its direct evidence of legality. To proxy for the former, we record the number of provenance entries for each lot; more entries indicate higher-quality provenance overall. To analyze legality, we record the earliest verifiable year listed in the provenance description, which provides a date at which the object was known to exist. By comparing this earliest year to applicable legal benchmark dates, we determine whether an object could be subject to a legal claim.
What do we mean by verifiable provenance? Because provenance information can be falsified, we adopt a conservative view of what information can be trusted. An object is deemed to be verifiably legal if any of its catalogued provenance information can be objectively proven to meet the cutoff date of 1970 (Classical objects) or 1983 (Egyptian objects in New York). The veri-3 The data set includes all antiquities sold at the above auction houses during that time frame with the exception of items that do not match the time period we consider (i.e. Byzantine Objects, Neolithic Stones fall outside our period of focus which lies between 2500 BC -400 AD period); the geographic boundaries we observe (out data covers southern Europe, Egypt and the Middle East, we do not for instance consider Iberian, Indian or Sudanese objects);
and collections of idiosyncratic objects that only sell in groups every number of years (i.e. jewelery and glassware).
fiable portions of provenance are previous auction sales (since historical auction catalogues will corroborate the information); publications in journals or books (since those might be consulted in a library); museum exhibits (since exhibition records could be requested); and other information that can be proven true or false (such as inventory numbers, export licenses, or gallery sales with extant records). Thus, we discount many items with evidence of legitimate provenance which are, nevertheless, not verifiable. Our conservative classification of provenance means that we reduce the probability of finding any significant market effects. For instance, if bidders trust the catalogue at face value (or if insider information allows bidders to verify information that we cannot), then many objects will be treated as legitimate by bidders when they are not classified as such in our data. Since we do indeed find substantial changes in market characteristics, we are confident that such findings are robust to a less stringent notion of what counts as "legal."
For a concrete example of how we construct our provenance indicator, consider two hypothetical provenance listings for an Egyptian statue at auction in New York: In the first case, the provenance listing has three entries (Swiss dealer; auction sale; publication). On the listing the object dates to 1969, making the sale of the object legitimate because it supposedly occurs pre-1983. But we cannot corroborate the information about the Swiss dealer.
In fact, this is the type of potential provenance pitfall we wish to avoid: Switzerland is known as one of the countries in which artifacts are laundered and provenance histories are faked. We can however verify that the object was sold at auction in 1991, but that is not early enough to assign legal provenance to this object. In the second case, the provenance history consists of two entries.
Again, we would not consider the private collection information as "verifiable." Nevertheless, we can verify the 1953 publication and categorize the object as meeting the threshold. culling of all items with poor provenance. Rather, the outcomes must have been accompanied by a behavioral change: auction houses must have put more effort into provenance research, or into identifying items with good provenance. This is also reflected in the number of provenance entries per item, which increased from a median of 0 to a median of 2. Overall auction house catalogues became higher quality and better-researched.
Summary Statistics
As for the demand side, we predict that after 2005 demand for objects with good provenance should be relatively larger. This is reflected in both sales rates and hammer prices. Objects with legal provenance sell at higher rates than other objects; this pattern was not much affected after 2005, indicating perhaps that auction houses' appraisals kept up with the changing demand. 4 And even before 2005, objects with legal provenance sold at a premium (the median premium on a legal object was around 100% for Classical and Egyptian objects). But as predicted, after 2005 hammer prices increased the most for legal objects.
Western Asiatic objects are an obvious exception to several of these patterns. Before 2005, Western Asiatic objects with legal provenance were appraised and sold at lower prices than others.
After 2005, fewer objects with legal provenance met their reserve price, but a higher fraction of 4 On average, 20-30% of the items go unsold, and legal items sell at higher rates than other items. This is a typical buy-in rate when compared with other categories of art, according to evidence in Ashenfelter & Graddy (2010) .
other objects actually sold. These are just some indications that Western Asiatic objects constitute their own idiosyncratic market, and that attributing any changes to the Schultz or Medici verdicts is likely wrong. This is because those cases did not have Western Asiatic pieces as objects, and there is no case law in particular targeting the illicit trade in this segment of the market. In addition connecting such objects with a country of origin is often difficult (objects from Iraq and Syria can hardly be told apart) and as ancient civilizations spanned regions of land that do not correspond to modern geographical boundaries, it is often unclear which jurisdiction applies.
In addition, changes in provenance quality cannot be entirely attributed to changes in object composition: the physical materials and types of objects being sold did not change much after
2005. Thus, secular collecting trends cannot have driven the large changes in auction composition observed before and after 2005. 5
Finally, an object's legality is inextricably linked to other characteristics, each of which impact price in their own right. This poses problems for identification: we cannot cleanly identify the effect of legality on price, since legal provenance cannot be disentangled from a number of exogenous characteristics including physical material and quality. Table 3 provides evidence for this fact. The table shows marginal effects from logit regressions of physical characteristics on the probability an object has legal provenance. For instance, among Classical objects, being made of marble strongly predicts legality, but may also positively impact the price. 6 The same is true of other characteristics for Egyptian and Western Asiatic objects. We therefore include the variables in Table 3 in the empirical analyses in the next section.
5 An exception is for Western Asiatic seals, which are small, intricately-carved objects very popular with collectors.
The market for these objects collapsed in the early 2000s, and the number sold decreased by about 70%. See Brodie (2011) for more details; he attributes the decrease to changes in collecting trends driven by increased negative publicity about provenance, which is a separate story from ours but offers yet another avenue by which societal context may shape market structure and collecting trends. 6 There are many reasons for marble's dual correlation with price and provenance. Marble was very popular among aristocrats long ago, so marble objects are more likely to have a long collection history (increasing both provenance quality and outright desirability to collectors). In addition, marble objects tend to be larger and more durable (also desirable traits), which makes them easier to track in major collections over time (hence improving the provenance).
Empirical Analysis and Results
Provenance Quality
Based on our hypothesis that court cases influence market structure and prices, we examine changing trends in the probability of and price paid for legal provenance. Table 4 shows marginal effects from difference-in-difference probit regressions for the probability that an arbitrary item has legal provenance. We include a generic time trend as well as time dummies for the period 2001-2005 (the years before and during the court cases) and post-2005 and characteristics X from Table 3 , according to equation 1. There are small but significant time trends in every category, with the probability of good provenance increasing by 1-3% each year. As expected, for Egyptian and Classical objects, the probability significantly increases after the court verdicts, by 17% in both categories. There is also an increase in the 2001-2005 period, although less large. Our placebo group, Western Asiatic objects, have no effect: the share of objects with legal provenance actually decreases in the era of the court cases. While it increases slightly afterwards, this may reflect more of a market correction.
If the 2001-2005 effects shown in Table 4 can be truly attributed to court verdicts, then they should appear only after 2003, the date of the Schultz verdict. Thus, to supplement Table 4 we more explicitly examine time trends and look for structural breaks. moving to smaller and better-researched auctions, the proportion of lots with legal provenance still increased after court verdicts, but only for Classical and Egyptian objects. To evaluate this empirically while remaining agnostic about the timing of any changes, we perform structural change regressions following Andrews (1993) , who generalizes the Chow test (Chow, 1960) when the change date is unknown.
We model each time series in Figure 1 as having an intercept with a trend.
Y t is, alternatively, the number of items sold; the proportion of items with legal provenance; or the number of provenance entries per item. Under the null hypothesis, the vector
constant in all periods t.Under the alternative hypothesis, β t takes one of two values, depending on the time period:
In our sample, t min = 0 corresponds to 1996, and t max = 17 corresponds to 2014. For those time series with a significant change, we additionally report the coefficients for regressions on the pre-and post-change subsamples. Most importantly, a significant structural break was found for the proportion of items with legal provenance, again only for Egyptian and Classical objects. Importantly, the results in the last column of Table 5 verify that Western Asiatic objects saw no significant post-verdict changes in the composition of provenance. In fact, the slope is not even significant, meaning that the proportion of legal Western Asiatic objects is basically a random fluctuation around a mean of roughly 17%. Thus, even though the number of Western Asiatic objects has decreased along with other types of objects, there is no evidence of a sustained effort to source and sell objects with legal provenance. This supports our theory that the market differentially responded to specific court cases depending on the specific type of objects considered in those cases.
Provenance Premium
We now consider changes in the distribution of prices for objects sold. We perform difference-indifference regressions at the mean and at several quantiles, because we expect the change in the provenance premium to differ according to objects' quality. The premium should increase less for low-quality objects which are rarely worth a legal investigation; conversely, it should change more for the highest-quality objects. Table 3 . Panel (a) confirms our predictions for Egyptian objects. The increased premium for provenance kicks in after 2005, increasing by 6.7% relative to pre-trial levels. But the magnitude of the increase varies with object quality. In particular, for the bottom 10% of legal objects the premium actually declined, while the 90 th percentile of legal objects' prices is 23%
higher than the 90 t h percentile of non-legal objects'. To check the robustness of our story, we consider alternative definitions of "legal" provenance. Table 6 disappear; the provenance premium appears to have shrunk by 10-30% after the verdict, across all quantiles of the price distribution. The change indicates that by regrouping some "legal" objects as "not legal" under our recoding scheme, we erased important distinctions between objects. This tells us that 1983 must indeed have significance for market participants, but only after the Schultz lawsuit clarified legal standards.
Resale
The above results confirm that objects with verifiably legal provenance were treated differently by auction houses and collectors in the aftermath of the Schultz and Medici verdicts. This has potentially important ramifications for the construction of repeat sales indices, which are the standard way to measure performance of art as an asset class (as well as other collectibles, or real estate).
It is well-established that repeat sales indices can be biased due to selection or aggregation (see, e.g. Dombrow et al. , 1997; Gatzlaff & Haurin, 1997) . However, changes in collecting trends can also bias the estimates, because a key identifying assumption fails to hold: the market no longer considers a resold object to be the "same" given the change in collecting standards. We are among the first to show that collecting tastes may truly affect repeat sales. Beggs & Graddy (2009) show a similar phenomenon, that objects' previous sale prices -which are in turn influenced by the market conditions at the time of sale -can impact the resale price.
Our data contain 1331 resale data points, in other words observations of items for which the recorded sale between 1996 and 2014 was the second time the object was auctioned at Christie's and/or Sotheby's. In order to ensure we are comparing items which were resold before the court cases impacted collectors' preferences with those items that were resold after, we select objects that sold twice before 2001 and compare them with those that sold once before 2001 and again afterwards (1196 total). For each object i we record the year and price of the initial purchase (the earliest such year was 1911) and examine two resale outcomes: the resale rate (probability of meeting reserve in the most recent sale) and the annual return r i (difference in log price, equation 5). Table 8 shows difference-in-difference regressions for our two resale outcomes. The table reinforces our previous conclusions about market effects of court cases, and also shows that a repeat sales index for the antiquities market would be biased due to both selection and changing value of objects' qualitative provenance. The first three columns examine selection by showing changes in resale rates. Egyptian objects had the greatest differential after court cases; objects with legal provenance were 10% more likely to sell than other objects; in addition, legal provenance on average had no impact on resale, indicating that the market did not distinguish objects by provenance until at least 2001. Classical objects show a more muted pattern, with only a 3% increase in the probability of selling. But Western Asiatic objects defy all the expected patterns: legal objects were much less likely to meet reserve, after 2001. Again, our placebo group appears to have its own collecting standards.
The last three columns show the change in the annual return. Again, legal provenance on average has very little impact on returns, but after 2005 the annual return was about 12% higher for Egyptian objects with legal provenance. Once again, Classical objects have a muted effect.
Western Asiatic objects appear to have virtually zero effect, although the sample is too small to draw specific conclusions.
Discussion
Results Interpretation and Selection Issues
Overall our analysis has shown that over time, buyers pay increasingly more for good provenance as they become acquainted with the potential repercussion of buying illicit items, and that auction houses sell an increasing fraction of well-provenanced objects to cater to the demand. We have also shown that auction sizes have decreased over our whole sample (Figure 1 ). This apparent secular change in auction size raises important questions about a potential shift in the channels antiquities are sold: has increased legal scrutiny driven the market underground? Are more pieces sold through alternative routes? This Section addresses these questions and the selection bias that may ensue by solely relying on auction house data.
By focusing on sales by Sotheby's and Christie's our results cover an important portion of the public international market for antiquities, but they may suffer from selection issues by not addressing other dimensions of the market, such as sales by second tier auction houses, art galleries, private dealers and online platforms. It may be that the litigation we discuss did not affect the trade through such channels. Consider the story of a Harvard professor who can no longer consign an Egyptian sarcophagus he purchased in the 1990s (Blumenthal & Mashberg, 2012) . What are the professor's alternatives in a pre-versus post-Schultz world? How do such alternatives differ according to whether the sarcophagus has good provenance or not? He could sell through a private deal (with a gallery or a dealer), at a public auction house or online, or he could keep the object.
Presumably, he only cares about the final sale price and not the specific means of sale.
If the item has a solid pre-1983 provenance, it will have significantly appreciated in value, and the collector would make a profit by selling at Christie's or Sotheby's, but also if he chooses other sales paths, such as a private deal. Published outcomes of auction sales of similar items (Sotheby's and Christie's are likely to display higher margins) would act as a point of reference for the owner even when negotiating with a private deal. A third possibility would be holding on to the object.
This could possibly become an even better option: the object may appreciate in value if the market continues to shrink and provenanced objects become more rare. But it may not be the safest option if there are further changes to the law or in collecting trends. We may reasonably conclude that the rational owner of a well-provenanced antiquity who is keen to sell, will choose to sell, and will significantly profit from his initial investment.
On the other hand, if the item was bought in the 1990s with no verifiable pre-1983 provenance, and further due diligence efforts do not uncover any additional provenance details, the seller's ability to sell for a profit decline in view of the Schultz ruling. Christie's or Sotheby's may still sell it, but a large object such as a sarcophagus is more likely to come under scrutiny and generate bad publicity if it does not have clean provenance. There are several scholars and organizations who keep close eyes on Christie's and Sotheby's auctions, and the auction houses regularly withdraw items from auction sales when the critics raise questions about the items' provenance (Brodie, 2014a) . It follows that the owner of an unprovenanced antiquity would be discouraged to advertise its sale on widely distributed auction catalogues. Overall, if there is insufficient information to rule out that the object could have been looted, Christie's and Sotheby's will likely turn it down, to avoid negative publicity and reputational damage.
This leaves the owner of the unprovenanced sarcophagus with two remaining options: a private deal (through a dealer or the private sales department of an auction house), or a lower-tier auction house. The choice to sell privately has the advantages of not attracting publicity or leaving a public record but it limits the outreach to potential buyers. However the price paid for the object will likely be lower in view of the limited liquidity of such asset: even an audience who does not care about provenance will be aware that the lack thereof will make the object a less attractive investment. 7 The other option is selling through lower-tier auction houses. We can observe sales activity in this tier: Bonhams is a close third behind Christie's and Sotheby's in terms of prestige and sales volume for antiquities; it is unlikely that an extremely high-quality piece such as Egyptian sarcophagus would be offered for sale at an even smaller auction house than Bonhams. And unlike
Christie's and Sotheby's, Bonhams faces less scrutiny from groups who police auction provenance.
Therefore, Bonhams offers the best evidence for whether items may "trickle down" from Christie's 7 Interviews with dealers and gallery owners on file with the authors confirm this.
and Sotheby's.
We collected data on all objects sold at Bonhams antiquities auctions since 2004 (unfortunately no data is available before, so we cannot perform the same difference-in-difference analysis as for the other auction houses). Of 11345 lots, we identified 1020 that were previously sold at either Christie's, Sotheby's, or Bonhams. Unlike Christie's and Sotheby's, Bonhams has maintained the size of its auctions over time; it consistently sells over 1000 lots each year. Overall, the above discussion and the best evidence we can find to supplement it, implies that antiquities sales through channels other than Sotheby's and Christie's are unlikely to confound our results, and that the more likely explanation for the shrinking number of sales is that the owners of objects whose provenance cannot be verified are choosing to not sell, because they are not worth their initial investment or a potential legal sentence.
Assessing Competing Explanations
We have argued that the increasing demand for provenanced antiquities since the mid 2000s was a response to the changes introduced by the Schultz and Medici cases. This section provides context for the above cases and explains that they were not two isolated events, but rather the outcome of a broader movement that allowed for them to happen and to have the impact that they had.
A number of factors were effective at creating a movement that made Schultz and Medici possible in the first place. The movement started with the passing of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and was strengthened by the implementation of more rigorous national laws and varying degrees of precedent. Table 1 shows that there was a line of precedent, at least in the U.S., that paved the way for the Schultz decision. Most such cases raised ownership issues that were very similar to those raised in Schultz and Medici, but they did not appear to affect the status quo that we observe until 2003, in which provenance does not significantly drive up prices. Why? One answer is that the earlier disputes involved different types of antiquities, mainly Pre-Columbian ones -and the rules governing that market are different. Another answer is that by the time Schultz and Medici were decided, enough public and political support had built up to support those decisions.
The timing between legal action and influential background events is often crucial for generating change. In 2003, after the Iraq invasion, the U.S. faced heavy criticism after the National Museum in Baghdad was plundered, and the Bush administration came under great public pressure to show its commitment to cultural heritage issues (see Rothfield, 2009 , for a history of the looting and its aftermath). The Schultz case provided a timely opportunity to show such commitment, by criminalizing the smuggling of antiquities just three months after the Iraq invasion. There was also political pressure to maintain good relationships with Egypt in view of the rising tumult in the Middle East. In short, a situation had materialized where legal action was able to support a movement that was gaining political attention. Newspaper coverage confirms this increased public attention to antiquities looting. As Figure 4 Combined, the formal judicial processes in Schultz and Medici resulted in clear answers to specific issues that were able shape the terms of future private and public negotiations. Such negotiations affected institutional remodeling and were therefore able to have a long lasting effect -that is why the market changes we identify have persisted to today.
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that under certain conditions court decisions may impact trade practices, eventhough the relevant laws had been in place for years. Our analysis focuses to the antiquities trade, but the same may be applicable to other markets. By credibly committing to sanction infringing behavior, including illicit trade, court cases enable market participants to directly confront the penalties resulting from infringements, in a way that the mere existence of laws and treaties rarely does. In addition we have seen that court outcomes may attract sufficient public attention that translates into political pressure and compels institutional parties to address the issues in question, in order to maintain credibility and beneficial relationships.
This paper has also uncovered new avenues for research at the intersection of law and economics.
It encourages future empirical research on global markets to take into account the separate impact of legality when analyzing the international trade of goods, and to take advantage of the applicability of different legal standards depending on where the goods are sold. It specifically suggests considering the influence of court outcomes on market behavior. Valuable factors to take into account are the effect of court victories, the clarity of legal standards introduced by court decisions, and whether the legal system is equipped with enforcement powers that make future threats to sanction credible.
Finally, amid growing concern that the antiquities trade funds terrorist groups in the Middle East and elsewhere, our paper speaks to potential public policy levers. The evidence in this paper shows that it may be possible to permanently reform the demand for such antiquities through a sustained string of legal investigations resulting in consistent legal standards and highly punitive outcomes. Such legal action would require coordination with foreign governments to determine the likely sources of Western Asiatic artifacts, and efforts to identify the applicable legislation. Our analysis has indicated that externalizing enforcement costs to "market countries" is an option that can be readily used by source countries affected by looting. 1996-2005 2006-2014 1996-2005 2006-2014 1996-2005 2006-2014 Note.-Regression is given by equation 1. Coefficients show marginal effect of each regressor on the probability that an object has verifiable legal provenance. Coefficients for variables in Table 3 are not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05 * * p < 0.01 * * * p < 0.001 Table 5 ). Note.-Regressions additionally include objects' physical characteristics listed in Table 3 . Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05 * * p < 0.01 * * * p < 0.001 Table 7 Quantile Diff-in- Note.-Regressions additionally include objects' physical characteristics listed in Table 3 .
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05 * * p < 0.01 * * * p < 0.001 Table 8 Difference 
